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Abstract 
How do private transfers differ by race and ethnicity and do such differences explain the racial and ethnic 
disparity in wealth? Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this study examines private transfers by 
race and ethnicity and explores a causal relationship between private transfers and wealth. We examine 
private transfers in the form of financial support received and given from extended families and friends, 
as well as large gifts and inheritances. Our findings highlight important differences in private transfers by 
race and ethnicity: African Americans and Hispanics (both immigrant and nonimmigrant) receive less in 
private transfers than non-Hispanic whites. Private transfers in the form of large gifts and inheritances 
(but not net support received) are importantly related to increases in wealth overall and for whites and 
black non-Hispanics. In total, we estimate that the African American shortfall in large gifts and inher-
itances accounts for 12 percent of the white-black racial wealth gap.  
  
ifferences in wealth holdings by race 
and ethnicity are well documented. 
Estimates vary across data source and 
year, but the racial differences are consistently 
large. The wealth of white families is roughly 8 
to 12 times higher than the wealth of black fami-
lies (Oliver and Shapiro 1995; Shapiro 2004; 
Wolff 2001). The difference between white and 
nonwhite families is somewhat smaller, yet still 
substantial. White families’ wealth is six to sev-
en times higher than the wealth of nonwhite 
families (Bricker et al. 2011; Bucks et al. 2009; 
Carasso and McKernan 2008; Conley 1999). 
Wealth and the accumulation of wealth can 
be influenced by an array of factors, including 
income, age, consumption needs (e.g., family 
size), expectations about the future, and prefer-
ences. Higher-income families with more discre-
tionary income (income above that necessary to 
cover essential household expenses) are more 
likely to have the capacity to save. Since African 
American and Hispanic families have lower in-
comes, on average, this can be one source of 
wealth differences. However, the literature sug-
gests that wealth differences across race and 
ethnicity are still large even after adjusting for 
differences in income (Conley 1999). 
Beyond one’s own characteristics and cir-
cumstances are those of friends and extended 
family. Private interhousehold transfers from 
friends and extended families can have im-
portant implications for wealth. These transfers 
can be in the form of bequests and inheritances, 
gifts that can be used for education or a down 
payment on a home, or support in times of a 
financial emergency. While inheritances gen- 
erally occur across generations, gifts and finan-
cial support can involve transfers both between 
and within generations. Differences in private 
transfers by race and ethnicity can influence 
wealth disparities. There may be racial or ethnic 
differences in private transfers because of differ-
ences in the networks of extended family or 
friends and the needs of the people in those 
networks. For example, the transfer of resources 
that are made to alleviate these hardships can 
adversely affect the ability of both givers and 
recipients to accumulate wealth. 
Using the 1999 through 2007 waves of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), this 
study explores how private transfers differ by 
race and ethnicity and the relationship between 
private transfers and wealth holdings. Specifical-
ly, we answer the following research questions: 
1. Do private transfers differ by race and 
ethnicity? 
2. How do private transfers influence 
wealth? 
Our findings highlight important differ-
ences in private transfers by race and ethnicity: 
African Americans and Hispanics (both immi-
grant and nonimmigrant) receive less in private 
transfers than non-Hispanic whites. Private 
transfers in the form of large gifts and inher-
itances (but not net support received) are 
importantly related to increases in wealth over-
all and for whites and black non-Hispanics. 
Large gifts and inheritances account for 12 per-
cent of the white-black racial wealth gap. 
This article builds upon a long-lasting  
debate on how intergenerational transfers ac-
count for wealth accumulation (Kotlikoff and 
Summers 1981, 1988; Modigliani 1988) and pro-
vides new information on the role that intergen-
erational transfers and inter vivos transfers play 
in helping recipients accumulate wealth and in 
explaining the racial disparity in wealth. Our 
main contributions to the literature are as fol-
lows: First, we examine various types of private 
transfers (i.e., support to and from extended 
families and friends, large gifts and inherit-
ances) and net support received based on trans-
fers received and given, which allow for the 
possibility that private transfers can not only 
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increase wealth (when received), but also de-
press wealth (when given). Second, we examine 
disparities in transfers and how that in turn ex-
plains wealth disparity by a combination of race, 
ethnicity, and immigration status, rather than a 
dichotomous white-black or white-nonwhite 
gap. Third, our empirical strategy based on fam-
ily-level panel data enables us to explore causal 
relationships between private transfers and 
wealth. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sec-
tion II provides a summary of the literature on 
racial differences in private transfers and the 
relationship between private transfers and 
wealth. Sections III, IV, and V describe the con-
ceptual framework, data, and empirical ap-
proach. Section VI presents the detailed results 
and section VII concludes with some policy im-
plications based on the findings. 
Literature 
In this section we discuss existing studies on 
private (interhousehold) transfers and the re-
lationship between private transfers and wealth 
directly and indirectly through kin networks. 
Private Transfers 
Most studies on private transfers in the United 
States focus on the relationship a transfer has 
with the recipient’s or giver’s income. These 
studies generally try to identify the motivation 
for private transfers (e.g., altruism, insurance). 
Empirical studies find varying results: some 
studies find that higher-income people receive 
less in the way of transfers (Altonji, Hayashi, 
and Kotlikoff 1997; McGarry and Schoeni 1995; 
Schoeni 1997), while others find they receive 
more (Cox 1987; Cox and Rank 1992; Zissi-
mopoulos 2001). The amount of private transfers 
and the likelihood of transfers are also associated 
with other characteristics of donors or  
recipients, such as age, educational attainment, 
family composition, and number of siblings and 
parents living (Cox and Rank 1992; Gale and 
Scholz 1994; Schoeni 1997). 
Studies that have examined racial differ-
ences in private transfers generally find black 
and Hispanic families are less likely to receive 
transfers or receive less. Cox and Rank (1992), 
using the 1987–88 National Survey of Families 
and Households (NSFH), find that black families 
are less likely to receive transfers than white 
families, but they do not differ significantly in 
the amount of transfers received. These results 
are also found in Cox (1987), Gale and Scholz 
(1994), and McGarry and Schoeni (1995). Based 
on multivariate logit models using the 1987–88 
NSFH, Lee and Aytac (1998) find that Hispanic 
families are more likely to give and less likely to 
receive transfers, compared with their white 
non-Hispanic counterparts, while black families 
are less likely to receive. Schoeni (1997), using 
the 1988 PSID, finds that nonwhite families re-
ceive less monetary support than white families. 
Wilhelm (2001), using the 1987–89 PSID, finds 
that white households have only a modestly 
higher incidence of transfer receipt but a sub-
stantially larger amount received, conditional on 
having received. 
Studies on inheritances and bequests again 
focus on its relation to income, as a test of mo-
tives for transfers. Wilhelm (1986), using the  
Estate-Income Tax Match data for 1980–82, finds 
that parents tend to give equal bequests to their 
children, rather than giving larger bequests to 
children with lower earnings. Wilhelm (2001), 
based on PSID 1984–89, reports that both the 
incidence of inheritance and the amount of in-
heritance for blacks are much lower than for 
whites. Using a more recent data set, the 2000 
Health and Retirement Study, Lee and Horioka 
(2004) show that white, older, wealthier, mar-
ried, more highly educated, healthy, and  
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nonreligious individuals are more likely to leave 
a bequest than other individuals. 
Private Transfers and Wealth 
There has been a longstanding debate on how 
much, quantitatively, intergenerational transfers 
play a role in wealth. Estimating the role of in-
tergenerational transfers by comparing estimat-
ed household saving (based on data on earnings 
and consumption) with observed aggregate 
wealth, Kotliloff and Summers (1981, 1988) con-
clude that intergenerational transfers account for 
about 80 percent of aggregate capital accumula-
tion, while Modigliani (1988) estimates no more 
than 20 percent. Kessler and Masson (1989) rec-
oncile some of the puzzles (including different 
measures and data) and point out that it is diffi-
cult to separate life-cycle savings from bequest 
savings. Thus, “there is no single correct de-
composition of wealth into inherited and self-
accumulated parts” (147). Some recent papers 
use microdata on self-reported inheritance to esti-
mate the role of bequests on wealth accumulation 
(Chiteji and Stafford 1999; Gale and Scholz 1994; 
Wilhelm 2001). For example, using data from the 
1983–86 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 
Gale and Scholz (1994) find that bequests ac-
count for 31 percent of net worth. 
Intergenerational transfers help explain but 
do not fully address wealth differences by race. 
Avery and Rendall (1997) conclude that roughly 
20 percent of the racial disparity in average 
wealth between black and white families can be 
accounted for by inheritance (as cited in Wil-
helm 2001). Similarly, Menchik and Jianakoplos 
(1997) ascribe 10 to 20 percent of wealth disparity 
to inheritance. 
Fewer studies examine how noninheritance 
transfers contribute to wealth, and findings are 
mixed. Some studies suggest that gifts are only 
of minor importance, with the possible excep-
tion of the wealthiest individuals (Tomes 1988). 
However, others find that a broader measure of 
transfers, including in-kind or in-cash transfers 
received by any “adult” child (even in the same 
household) make them more important than 
inheritance (Cox 1987; Cox and Raines 1985). 
Gale and Scholz (1994) also find that noninher-
itance transfers are important, accounting for at 
least 20 percent of U.S. wealth. 
Most of these studies on wealth and trans-
fers are limited by the cross-sectional nature of 
the data, hence the potential endogeneity of pri-
vate transfers is not well controlled for. For ex-
ample, Cox (1987) uses the President’s Com- 
mission on Pension Policy survey from 1979,  
Jayakody (1998) uses the 1988 wave of the PSID, 
Wilhelm (2001) uses the 1989 wave of the PSID 
to examine the relation between wealth and pri-
vate transfers, and Menchik and Jianakoplos 
(1997) use the 1989 cross-sectional SCF and the 
1976 wave of National Longitudinal Survey of 
Mature Men. 
Kin Characteristics and Wealth 
Some studies indirectly look at the relationship 
between private transfers and wealth through 
kin-level characteristics. Chiteji and Hamilton 
(2005), using the PSID wealth data for 1984, 
1989, 1994, and 1999, find that poverty of sib-
lings or parents is associated with lower levels 
of wealth and less ownership of bank accounts 
and stock. This study infers transfers or gifts due 
to poverty of siblings, but does not examine 
transfer income directly. Other research finds 
that kin-level characteristics are important for 
explaining racial disparities in bank account 
ownership, though not homeownership (Heflin 
and Pattillo 2002). Goldstein and Warren (2000) 
find that network diversity and reach are related 
to an improved sense of financial security; that 
is, families with more diverse or broader net-
works are more likely to be satisfied with their 
present financial situation. Sarkisian and Gerstel 
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(2004), using the NSFH 1992–94, show that 
blacks and whites have different patterns of kin 
support involvement: blacks are more involved 
in practical support (including help with house-
work, transportation, and child care), while 
whites report greater financial and emotional 
kin support. 
Although the literature is informative, gaps 
remain in the understanding of how private 
transfers affect racial disparities in wealth. Using 
recent panel data, we go beyond the existing 
literature by examining racial disparities in vari-
ous types of private transfers (i.e., large gifts and 
inheritances, and support received by and given 
to parents, relatives, and friends), how these 
transfers affect wealth accumulation, and to 
what extent racial differences in private trans-
fers explain the racial gap in wealth. 
Conceptual Framework 
Private Transfer Motives 
Existing studies have developed several models 
of private (interhousehold) transfer motives and 
behavior, including altruism, exchange, and in-
surance. In the altruism model, which was 
brought to prominence by Barro (1974) and 
Becker (1974), financial need is linked directly to 
income transferred. Specifically, the model  
predicts that the amount of private transfers re-
ceived decreases as income of the recipient  
increases, because the recipient’s financial need 
decreases. In other models, private transfers 
may not be motivated by pure altruism but in-
stead by exchange or self-interest (impure altru-
ism). In the exchange model (Bernheim, Shleifer, 
and Summers 1985; Cox 1987) parents may give 
their child money or the promise of a future be-
quest in exchange for housework or companion-
ship, for example. Similarly, transfers can flow 
from an adult child to a parent (or other adult) 
in return for child care or the hopes of a future 
inheritance. Transfers can also be used as a type 
of insurance (Cox 1990; Cox and Jappelli 1990; 
Kochar 1997). For instance, a person gives mon-
ey to his unemployed relative (or friend) as in-
surance for receiving similar help in the future 
when he faces a financial emergency (i.e., quid 
pro quo).1 
Findings from the literature suggest no clear 
motive for private transfers. The empirical evi-
dence generally rejects pure altruism as a motive 
for transfers but does provide support for im-
pure altruism and exchange, as well as insur-
ance motives (Laferrere and Wolff 2006; 
McKernan, Pitt, and Moskowitz 2005). The goal 
of our paper is not to test which transfer model 
dominates but, rather, to use this literature to 
inform our empirical specification. 
Based on these theories, the needs and re-
sources of the givers and receivers play an  
important role in private-transfer motives. If altru-
ism plays a role in transfers, then larger transfers 
go to people with greater needs. That is, more 
dollars will be transferred to people with lower 
incomes (current and permanent) and greater 
need (i.e., people who are disabled, have more 
children, are single parents). Coresidence is a 
form of private transfer and is expected to de-
crease monetary private transfers. If altruism is 
not a motivator, then people with greater need 
may not receive more transfer income. In fact,  
if transfers are given as a form of insurance 
against unexpected future events, then transfers 
may be less likely to go to persons with low 
permanent income because of their lower likeli-
hood of providing resources when an emergency 
arises (i.e., providing insurance). So, while it is 
important to control for these factors, their ex-
pected effect on transfer behavior is ambiguous. 
Many transfers occur within families (e.g., 
from parents to adult children and vice versa), 
so characteristics of the extended family are also 
important—such as the number of siblings living 
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and whether the parents are alive. Having a liv-
ing parent may increase transfers received, as 
transfers often go from parents to children. Hav-
ing a living parent may also reduce transfers to 
siblings, for example, because the parent can 
play that role. On the other hand, having an old-
er parent in need could increase the amount of 
transfers given. 
Race and ethnicity may also be related to 
private transfers. If people reside in networks 
made up primarily of people of their own race 
or ethnicity, then the current unequal distribu-
tion of income by race would have important 
implications for transfers by race. On average, 
minorities have lower incomes than nonminori-
ties, so if transfers are related to own income 
and the ability of others to repay in the future 
(i.e., provide insurance), then we would expect 
fewer transfers given to and received by minori-
ties, as compared with nonminorities. On the 
other hand, if minorities are more likely to have 
networks beyond their immediate families and 
include a broader circle of extended family and 
friends (Heflin and Pattillo 2002), then this 
broader network may result in more transfer 
activity. Thus, the relationship between race and 
transfer behavior is ambiguous. Similarly, im-
migrants may have smaller social networks in 
the United States so receive less transfer income 
than nonimmigrants. Many immigrants, particu-
larly those from less developed countries, often 
send remittances to extended family members in 
their home country, so may give more transfers 
than similarly situated nonimmigrants. 
The Role of Private Transfers in 
Wealth Building 
Private transfers are important for families, as 
transfers both received and given can have im-
plications for wealth building. Transfers re-
ceived can be saved and immediately added to 
wealth. The funds could also be invested in education 
or used for the purchase of a home, which are 
expected to facilitate future (versus current) 
wealth gains as benefits of the investment pay 
off over time (Beverly et al. 2008; Shapiro 2004).2 
Private transfers can also be used to fund unex-
pected needs (e.g., car repair or medical bill), to 
pay for expenses in the face of an adverse event 
(e.g., job loss), or for other consumption. While 
none of these uses results in an immediate in-
crease in wealth, the availability of monetary 
resources in an emergency and the avoidance of 
hardship (e.g., eviction) can have long-term im-
plications for family stability and asset building. 
The availability of transfer income can also 
lower wealth holdings. If families rely on pri-
vate transfers to meet their emergency needs, 
rather than saving for an emergency, then their 
savings will be lower on average. While there 
are offsetting effects, greater private transfers are 
expected to increase wealth (Beverly et al. 2008). 
On the reverse side, giving income to ex-
tended family and friends can result in a direct 
reduction in dollars available to save and, thus, 
wealth. Also, if an individual expects that ex-
tended family and friends will ask for financial 
help if they have savings, the individual may 
choose to increase his or her consumption rather 
than save it. However, if transfers given to oth-
ers come directly out of consumption, then there 
would be no reduction in wealth. Overall, giv-
ing transfers is hypothesized to reduce wealth. 
By and large, the characteristics of family or 
extended family that are hypothesized to affect 
private transfers are also hypothesized to affect 
wealth. We do not, however, include infor-
mation about the family head and spouse/ 
partner’s siblings and parents—number of sib-
lings and parents that are living—because these 
variables should affect wealth only through 
their effect on private transfers. 
OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP  PROJECT 
6 6 
Data 
The data for this study come from the PSID, a 
longitudinal survey that began in 1968 with a 
nationally representative sample of about 5,000 
families and that interviewed respondents an-
nually from 1968 to 1997 and biennially thereaf-
ter. Data on wealth and private transfers have 
been collected at each interview since 1999, and 
we use all available waves of data from 1999 
forward (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007).3 All 
dollar values for our analysis are in real 2007 
dollars.4 Our analysis includes 33,947 family-
year observations from 1999 to 2007. 
Beyond wealth and private-transfer income 
given and received, the PSID survey collects a 
host of other information on individuals and 
families, including total income and components 
of income, family composition and size, educa-
tional attainment, whether in school, disability 
status, age, gender, immigrant status, and race/ 
ethnicity.5 The PSID also provides information 
on parents and siblings, including number of 
siblings who are living and number of parents 
who are living (in 2007).6 All family household 
composition and demographic variables are col-
lected at the time of the interview, as is wealth. 
Family income (and thus private transfers) is 
collected for the year prior to the interview year. 
We provide additional information on our key 
measures—private transfer income and 
wealth—in turn below. 
Private Transfer Income 
At each interview, data on family income, along 
with transfer income given and received, are 
collected. One series of transfer income ques-
tions is aimed at capturing money given and 
received to support or help families. We use this 
information to construct net support received in 
the prior calendar year.7 The focus of these ques-
tions on support suggests that the values reported 
do not include gifts. For transfer income given, 
we construct a measure that captures the 
amount of money family members gave toward 
the support of people not living with them, ex-
cluding required payments such as child sup-
port and alimony.8 For transfer income received, 
we construct a measure that captures the 
amount of money the family head and spouse/ 
partner received in help from friends and rela-
tives. One difference between these measures is 
that “transfers given” captures all transfers by 
family members, while “transfers received” are 
those received by the family head and his or her 
spouse/partner.9 
The PSID also provides information on 
whether anyone in the family received a large 
gift or inheritance over $10,000 in each year 
since the last interview. The value of each 
gift/inheritance (if there are multiple) and the 
year it was received is captured. The question-
naire does not allow us to separately identify large 
gifts from inheritances. Because of the different 
nature (support versus large gifts and inher-
itances) and size of the transfers, we examine 
large gifts and inheritances separately from oth-
er transfers. One weakness of the PSID is that it 
does not capture whether family members re-
ceived gifts or inheritances of less than $10,000. 
Based on the PSID data available, our em-
pirical analyses focus on four transfer outcome 
variables measured at the family level: 
• value of support received (i.e., help 
from friends/relatives not living with 
family), 
• value of support given (i.e., support to 
people not living with family), 
• value of net support received (support 
received minus support given), and 
• value of large gifts and inheritances  
received.10 
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Wealth 
The PSID provides information on the value of 
wealth holdings at the time of the interview, not 
the prior calendar year (as with the income and 
transfer variables). Our analysis uses family net 
worth, which is defined as assets minus liabili-
ties. The PSID has relatively few asset and liabil-
ity questions (compared with the SCF and the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation, for 
example), but generally provides a good ac-
counting for the major components of net worth. 
Analyses do, however, suggest that the PSID 
does a better job capturing the wealth of low-
wealth families as compared to higher-wealth 
families (i.e., the top 5 to 10 percent of the 
wealth distribution) (Ratcliffe et al. 2008).11 
Consistent with the literature (Carasso and 
McKernan 2008; Shapiro 2004; Wolff 2001), we 
find large differences in wealth holdings by race 
and ethnicity. Median net worth for black non-
Hispanic and Hispanic families is less than one-
sixth and one-fourth (respectively) the median 
net worth of white non-Hispanic families 
($18,181 for black non-Hispanics, $33,619 for 
Hispanics, and $122,927 for white non-
Hispanics).12 These huge wealth disparities can-
not be explained solely by income disparities 
and are the motivation for this paper.13 
Empirical Approach 
Our empirical analyses examine the determi-
nants of private transfer income, with a focus on 
differences by race and ethnicity, as well as how 
private transfers influence wealth holdings. The 
models used to address these research areas dif-
fer, so we describe them separately below. 
Private Transfers and Differences by 
Race and Ethnicity 
The empirical model measures the relationship 
between private transfers and race/ethnicity, 
taking account of family economic and social 
factors. We examine four family-level private 
transfer variables: (1) value of net support re-
ceived (i.e., support received minus support 
given), (2) value of support received, (3) value of 
support given, and (4) value of large gifts and 
inheritances received. We estimate separate 
models for each of these four transfer measures. 
The regression model for the value of private 
transfers (Yft) for family f in year t is as follows: 
௙ܻ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ௙ܴ ൅ ߚଶܫ௙௧ ൅ ߚଷ ௙ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௙௧           [1] 
Using net support received as an example, 
Yft indicates the value of net private support re-
ceived by family f in year t. We use five waves of 
data from the PSID (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 
2007), so the time element t indicates that fami-
lies are included in the regression model up to 
five times (i.e., in the five years).14 To account for 
the fact that families enter the model multiple 
times, we cluster our standard errors by family. 
The explanatory variables are drawn from 
the conceptual framework described above. Rf is 
a set of variables that represents family race/ 
ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-
Hispanic, Hispanic, and other) and immigrant 
status (immigrant versus nonimmigrant). Ift rep-
resents family nonprivate-transfer income in 
year t.15 Xft represents other family economic 
and demographic factors in year t including 
family head’s age and educational attainment, 
family composition and size, whether the family 
head is in school, whether the family head or 
spouse/partner is disabled, and whether extend-
ed family or adult children live with the family. 
In this model, Xft also includes information 
about the family head and spouse/partner’s  
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siblings and parents (number of siblings that are 
living and number of parents that are living). 
Functional Form 
Our analysis of net support received uses a 
weighted least squares (WLS) model, with the 
dependent variable ranging from −$160,785 (dol-
lars received is less than dollars given) to 
$112,062 (dollars received is greater than dollars 
given). For our analyses of the other three trans-
fer measures (i.e., transfers given, transfers re-
ceived, and large gifts and inheritances re-
ceived) we use a Tobit model, which takes ac-
count of the large proportion of families that do 
not give or receive money in a given year (90.8 
percent, 86.6 percent, and 96.5 percent, respec-
tively). The estimated coefficients from the Tobit 
model do not have a straightforward interpreta-
tion, so we present the marginal effect.16 
Private Transfers and Wealth 
For this analysis we examine how private trans-
fers influence wealth. If private-transfer income 
received (in net) increases wealth holdings, then 
lower receipt of transfers by minorities could 
partially explain differences in wealth holdings 
by race. We separately examine net support re-
ceived and large gifts/inheritances, since the 
propensity to spend versus save and invest these 
transfers may differ. 
Our empirical approach uses panel data and 
a family-level fixed-effect model to control for 
the endogeneity of private transfers. When esti-
mating the effect of private transfers on wealth, 
endogeneity concerns arise because people who 
give/receive private transfers may differ from 
people who do not give/receive transfers in un-
observed ways, such as in their propensity to 
save. For example, families that are “savers” 
(i.e., are able to delay gratification) are expected 
to have higher wealth holdings and be more 
able to provide private transfers, all else equal. In 
this case, providing transfers would be positively 
associated with wealth, but giving transfers is 
not causing wealth to increase. Our family-level 
fixed-effect model eliminates time-invariant un-
observed differences between families. 
Time-varying characteristics, such as a 
change in economic circumstances, can also af-
fect both private transfers and wealth holdings. 
The onset of an economic emergency could re-
sult in an increase in private transfers received 
and reduced wealth, but the private transfers 
received are not causing wealth to decline. Our 
model controls for some important time-varying 
characteristics, including family income and 
disability status of the head/spouse, but may 
omit other relevant time-varying characteristics. 
Under the assumption that time-varying unob-
servable characteristics do not influence both 
private transfers and wealth, our model captures 
the effect of private transfers on wealth. If there 
are time-varying unobservable characteristics 
that influence both private transfers and wealth, 
the family-level fixed-effect model captures the 
relationship between private transfers and 
wealth holdings. Our analysis of large gifts and 
inheritances may suffer less from omitted variable 
bias, since the transfer of a large gift or inher-
itance (versus net support) is less likely to be 
influenced by current family economic circum-
stances (i.e., more likely to be exogenous). 
Our wealth model examines wealth hold-
ings this year (t) and private transfers received 
in the last one to two years (t−1, t−2). The timing 
elements in this model are partly dictated by the 
availability of PSID data. Wealth and net private 
transfers are only available every other year, 
with wealth holdings collected at the time of the 
survey (t) and net transfer income available for 
the prior calendar year (t−1).17 Respondents are 
asked to provide the value of large gifts and in-
heritances received since the last PSID interview, 
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which we denote as t−1 and t−2. With this in-
formation, the model is specified as follows: 
 
௙ܹ௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ ௙ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܩ௙,௧ିଵ,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܫ௙௧ ൅
ߚସ ௙ܺ௧ ൅ ߤ௙ ൅ ߝ௙௧                               [2] 
Wft is the natural log of wealth held by fami-
ly f in year t. We specify the dependent variable 
as the natural log of wealth to make it less sensi-
tive to outlying observations and to mitigate its 
skewed distribution (wealth holding is highly 
skewed toward high-wealth families).18 Tf,t−1 is 
the value of net support received by family f last 
year (t−1) and Gf,t−1,t−2 is the value of large gifts 
and inheritances received by family f since the 
last interview. The model would ideally include 
net support received two years ago (t−2), as these 
transfers could influence families’ current wealth 
holdings. However, as discussed above, net 
support received two years ago is not available 
in the PSID. Also, the PSID only captures gifts 
and inheritances of $10,000 or more, so gifts and 
inheritances that are still substantial but less 
than $10,000 are not captured. 
In this model, μf is the family-level fixed  
effect. By including the family-level fixed effect, 
time-invariant characteristics are controlled for 
by the fixed effects and drop out of the model. 
The control variables in the model—Ift, and Xft—
are as specified in the model above, except that 
Xft does not include time-invariant characteristics 
(i.e., race and ethnicity) or information about the 
family head and spouse/partner’s siblings and 
parents. The extended family variables are ex-
cluded from the wealth model because these 
variables should affect wealth only through 
their effect on net support received and gifts/ 
inheritances. 
Under the assumption that time-varying 
unobservable characteristics do not influence 
both private transfers and wealth, the coefficient 
β1 measures the effect of net support received on 
wealth holdings and β2 measures the effect of 
large gifts and inheritances on wealth holdings. 
We estimate this model for the full sample and 
by race—white non-Hispanics, black non-
Hispanics, and Hispanics. 
For comparison purposes, we also estimate a 
model that excludes the family-level fixed effect. 
This model does not control for unobserved 
time-invariant family-level characteristics and is 
more similar to the approach taken in the prior 
literature. Because the amount of transfers a 
family receives can be related to their wealth 
holdings, this model also includes a lagged val-
ue of wealth (wealth at t−2).19 We interpret these 
models as capturing the relationship between 
private transfers and wealth holdings. 
Private Transfers’ Role in the Racial 
Wealth Gap 
To quantify how much of the racial wealth gap 
is explained by racial differences in private 
transfers, we apply the Oaxaca decomposition 
developed in Oaxaca (1973). The difference in 
average wealth between whites and blacks (or 
Hispanics) can be decomposed into two compo-
nents: (1) the racial wealth gap due to differ-
ences in mean observed characteristics, such as 
age, education, and large gifts and inheritances; 
and (2) the racial wealth gap due to differences 
in estimated parameters between the regression 
on whites and the regression on blacks (or His-
panics). The following equation takes the white-
black wealth gap as an example. 
ഥܹ௪ െ ഥܹ௕ ൌ ሺܼ̅௪ െ ܼ̅௕ሻߚመ௪ െ ܼ̅௕ሺߚመ௪ െ ߚመ௕ሻ    [3] 
and alternatively, 
ഥܹ௪ െ ഥܹ௕ ൌ ሺܼ̅௪ െ ܼ̅௕ሻߚመ௕ െ ܼ̅௪ሺߚመ௪ െ ߚመ௕ሻ    [4] 
Wഥw	is the weighted average of log net worth 
among white families and ഥܹ௕ is the weighted 
average of log net worth among black families. 
ߚመ௪	and	ߚመ௕	are vectors of estimated coefficients 
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from separate regressions on the sample of white 
families and black families. ܼ̅௪	and	ܼ̅௕ are vectors 
of mean observed characteristics. We calculate 
ሺ ഥܹ௪ െ ഥܹ௕ሻ from equation [3] and equation [4], 
and then take the average, as done in prior stud-
ies (e.g., Menchik and Jianakoplos 1997). Focus-
ing on large gifts and inheritances, the estimated 
portion of the white-black wealth gap explained 
by large gifts and inheritances (G) is 
ሺ̅ܩ௪ െ ̅ܩ௕ሻሺߚመ௪ ൅ ߚመ௕ሻ/2ሺ ഥܹ௪ െ ഥܹ௕ሻ               [5] 
Results 
Private Transfers by Race and Ethnicity 
Descriptively, there are large differences in pri-
vate transfers by race and ethnicity (figures 1 
and 2). Compared with white non-Hispanic 
families, black non-Hispanic families are more 
likely to receive support (though they received 
much less, conditional on receiving) and His-
panic families are less likely to receive support 
(and received less, conditional on receiving).20 
On net, Hispanic families receive less support 
than white non-Hispanic families. In fact, His-
panic families have negative net support re-
ceived because they give more than they receive. 
There is no statistically significant difference 
between net support received for whites and 
blacks; the difference between whites and blacks 
emerges in the regression analysis, once income 
and other factors are controlled for. Both black 
non-Hispanic and Hispanic families are five 
times less likely to receive large gifts and inher-
itance than white non-Hispanic families. These 
findings are largely consistent with Wilhelm’s 
(2001) earlier PSID findings that black families 
received substantially less in inter vivos gifts in 
1987 (conditional on receiving)21 and were sub-
stantially less likely to ever inherit, and to inherit 
less when they did inherit, than white families. 
Interestingly, we find that Hispanic families are 
more likely to give support (though they give 
less, conditional on giving) than white non-
Hispanic families. This likely results because 
Hispanics are more than five times as likely to 
support their parents than white non-Hispanics 
(9.5 percent versus 1.7 percent, not shown). 
The regression estimates suggest that pri-
vate transfers differ importantly by race and 
ethnicity after controlling for family economic 
and demographic factors. Differences by race 
and ethnicity are found for net support received, 
support received, support given, and large gifts 
and inheritances, with the overall result being 
that minority families receive less in private 
transfers than white families. 
Hispanic immigrant, Hispanic non-immigrant, 
and black (non-Hispanic, nonimmigrant) fami-
lies receive an average of $278 to $589 less per 
year in net support than white (non-Hispanic, 
nonimmigrant) families (table 1, column 1). This 
is because all three minority groups receive less 
in support, and Hispanic families give more in 
support than white families. Hispanic immi-
grant and nonimmigrant families receive $208 
and $126 less per year in support than white 
families, and give $1,078 and $363 more per year 
in support, respectively. Black families receive 
$365 less in support and give $520 less in support 
than white families (table 1, columns 2 and 3).22, 23 
Turning from support to large gifts and in-
heritances, the differences get substantially larger. 
Hispanic immigrant and non-Hispanic immi-
grant families receive $2,123 and $1,772 less in 
large gifts and inheritances, on average, than 
white (non-Hispanic, nonimmigrant) families. 
Black (non-Hispanic, nonimmigrant) families 
receive an astounding $5,013 less in large gifts 
and inheritances, on average, than white fami-
lies (table 2, column 4). These average differ-
ences in large gifts and inheritances, which are 
measured over a two-year period, add up to 
substantial amounts over time and, as we discuss 
below, play an important role in wealth disparity. 
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Family economic and demographic characteristics. 
We find evidence that private transfers go to 
people with greater need, with a few exceptions. 
Families that have lower (nonprivate transfers) 
income and are unmarried, younger, disabled, 
and in school (as measured by the head or spouse’s 
status), receive more support than their coun-
terparts (table 1, column 2). Notable exceptions 
are that families with a less-educated head are 
less likely to receive support and families with 
more children are no more likely to receive sup-
port than their counterparts. It is also interesting 
to note that higher-income families receive more 
in large gifts/inheritance than lower-income fami-
lies. As expected, living with extended family or 
adult children (which is a form of nonmonetary 
private transfer) reduces monetary private transfers. 
Characteristics of the extended family are 
also important determinants of private transfers 
in much the way expected. Private transfers,  
in the form of both support and large gifts/ 
inheritances, decrease with the number of  
siblings of the head and spouse who are living, 
suggesting that they share the support of their 
parents. Support received increases when a par-
ent is living, but large gifts/inheritances decrease.24 
Private Transfers’ Influence on Wealth 
Our hypothesis is that overall private-transfer 
income in the form of net support received, 
large gifts, and inheritances helps families ac-
cumulate wealth. Our finding that black non-
Hispanics and Hispanics receive less in private 
transfers than whites suggests that private trans-
fers may indeed help explain the racial wealth 
disparity, if transfers increase wealth. How then 
do private transfers influence wealth and to 
what extent do private transfers explain the ra-
cial wealth gap? Our results suggest that private 
transfers in the form of large gifts and inherit- 
ances, but not net support received, increase 
wealth. Overall, we find that large gifts and  
inheritance explain 12 percent of the white-black 
wealth gap. 
The non-fixed-effect specification estimates 
that $1,000 in large gifts and inheritances in a 
year is associated with a 0.40 percent (p=0.00) 
increase in wealth the next year. Evaluating this 
percent increase at the median of wealth for the 
sample ($83,360) suggests that the additional 
$1,000 in private transfers is associated with an 
additional $331 in wealth (table 2, column 1).25, 26 
Net support received is marginally negatively 
related to wealth in this specification (p=0.09). 
Separating net support received into support 
received and support given provides some insight 
into the counterintuitive negative relationship  
between net support received and wealth in the 
non-fixed-effect specification: giving support is 
associated with increases in wealth (coefficient= 
0.01; p=0.04, not shown). This finding suggests 
that wealthier people are more likely to provide 
support and highlights the importance of control-
ling for the endogeneity of private transfers—
especially support given. This counterintuitive 
relationship disappears in the fixed-effect specifi-
cation, which controls for this endogeneity. 
Results from the fixed-effect specification 
suggest that large gifts and inheritances increase 
wealth. The magnitude of the relationship is 
smaller than the non-fixed-effect specifcation: a 
$1,000 increase in large gifts and inheritances 
results in a 0.25 percent, or $209, increase in 
wealth (evaluated at median wealth; table 2, 
column 2). Net support received does not influ-
ence wealth. This lack of relationship between 
financial support and wealth continues to hold 
when support received and support given enter 
this specification individually, rather than as net 
support received (p=0.30 and p=0.40 respectively, 
not shown). 
Large gifts and inheritance are especially 
important in accumulating wealth for black non-
Hispanics (table 2, columns 3–5). A $1,000 increase 
in large gifts and inheritance results in a $691 
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increase in net worth for black non-Hispanics and 
$295 for white non-Hispanics. This effect for 
Hispanics is not statistically significant, which 
may result from the smaller sample of Hispanics. 
Using the Oaxaca decomposition described 
above, we find that 12 percent of the difference 
in wealth between white non-Hispanic and 
black non-Hispanic families can be explained by 
the difference in their average large gifts and 
inheritance received during the past 10 years.27 
Our estimate is consistent with other studies  
in the literature. For example, Menchik and 
Jianakoplos (1997) find that racial differnces in 
inheritance explain about 10 to 20 percent of the 
average racial difference in wealth, while Avery 
and Rendall (1997) find that roughly 20 percent 
of the wealth disparity between black and white 
families can be accounted for by inheritance. We 
do not find evidence that disparity in average 
wealth between Hispanic and white non-Hispanic 
families can be accounted for by large gifts and 
inheritances. 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Motivated by racial differences in wealth, we 
undertook this paper to fill gaps in knowledge 
about how private transfers differ by race and 
relate to wealth. Using Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics data from 1999 through 2007, we pre-
sent new findings on the differences in private 
transfers by race and ethnicity, and the effect of 
private transfers on wealth controlling for (time-
invariant) differences across families. 
We find that minority families receive less in 
private transfers than white families. Control-
ling for income and other factors, Hispanic and 
black non-Hispanic families receive $270 to $600 
less per year in net support than white non-
Hispanic families. This is because both minority 
groups receive less in support, and Hispanic 
families—especially immigrant Hispanic families—
give more in support than white non-Hispanic 
families. Turning from support to large gifts and 
inheritances, the shortfalls in private transfers 
for minorities (versus nonminorities) move from 
hundreds of dollars to thousands of dollars. 
Immigrant families receive about $2,000 less in 
large gifts and inheritances, on average, than 
white (non-Hispanic, non-immigrant) families. 
Black (non-Hispanic, nonimmigrant) families re-
ceive about $5,000 less. These average differences in 
large gifts and inheritances, which are measured 
over a two-year period, add up to substantial 
amounts over time and can play an important 
role in wealth accumulation. 
Overall, we estimate that private transfers in 
the form of large gifts and inheritances increase 
wealth and explain 12 percent of the white-black 
wealth gap. Private transfers made to support 
families had no statistically significant effect on 
wealth. These transfers are likely being con-
sumed, not saved or invested, and so may be 
important in alleviating immediate economic 
hardship. They may also have long-term impli-
cations for family stability and asset building. 
The findings suggest that programs that 
provide additional income to low-income fami-
lies (such as cash welfare benefits or the earned 
income tax credit) will help minorities who are 
disproportionately poor but will not close the 
wealth gap. Even after controlling for differ-
ences in income, minorities receive fewer private 
transfers and these transfers result in less wealth 
accumulation. More than income-based policies 
are needed to close the racial wealth gap. 
Large gifts are often used to finance higher 
education or make a down payment for a house. 
Public policies that provide or subsidize educa-
tion, for example, could enable families without 
sources of these large gifts acquire a college edu-
cation. That would increase their earning capacity 
and with it, their ability to accumulate wealth. 
Increased Pell Grants or refundable education 
tax credits might be good approaches. Policies 
that facilitate the accumulation of down payments 
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for houses or alter the terms of such would be 
another way to reduce the wealth gaps.28 Wealth 
in the form of housing is usually the largest sin-
gle asset families have. Strategies to reduce bar-
riers to homeownership would reduce racial 
wealth gaps, while recently proposed policies to 
increase down-payment requirements have the 
potential to aggravate wealth disparities. Educa-
tion scholarships and down-payment assistance 
targeted at minorities move beyond income and 
thus could help close the wealth gap. 
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Notes 
1. A key difference between these three models is the rela-
tionship between the utility of the giver and the receiver: 
In the (pure) altruism model, the donor cares directly 
about the recipient’s utility (i.e., the recipient’s utility  
enters directly into the donor’s utility function). In the ex-
change model, which is generally referred to as an impure 
altruism model, the donor cares about the recipient’s utili-
ty as well as the services they receive in exchange for the 
transfer income, such as time spent on companionship or 
housework. The insurance model assumes that the donor 
does not care about the recipient’s utility (nonaltruism 
model), so the recipient’s utility does not enter into the 
donor’s utility function. In this model, individuals cannot 
self-insure to smooth consumption, due to credit market 
constraints, so they enter a reciprocity contract to receive 
assistance when needed. 
2. There are fixed costs associated with the purchase of a 
home, so the benefits of the home purchase would be  
observed over time. 
3. Prior to 1999, wealth information was only collected in 
1984, 1989, and 1994. 
4. Dollars are adjusted using the Consumer Price Index—All 
Urban Consumers (Current Series) by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
5. Our analysis by race and ethnicity is based on the race and 
ethnicity of the head of the household. Interracial mar-
riage is not common in the PSID sample. For example, in 
our 2007 sample, only 75 out of a total of 4,482 families are 
headed by a white person with a black spouse, and 21 
families are headed by a black person with a white spouse. 
6. We only have information on number of parents living as 
reported in 2007, so this variable is not time varying in 
our empirical models. 
7. When the PSID shifted to biennial interviewing, it began 
collecting many, but not all, data items for each of the two 
prior years. While income support received from two 
years ago is collected, income support given is only  
collected from the past year, not two years ago. Thus, we 
are not able to construct a measure of net support received 
two years ago. 
8. Our measure does not include loans or charitable contri-
butions to organizations. 
9. The PSID does not provide information that allows us to 
separate out transfers given by the family head and 
spouse/partners and other family members. 
10. For support received, support given, and large gifts and 
inheritances, the top 0.25 percent of outliers among those 
who reported transfers are trimmed. Net support received 
is calculated from these trimmed values. 
11. We trim the top and bottom 0.25 percent of outliers in  
net worth. 
12. These large differences in net worth stem from lower 
asset holdings for minorities, not higher debt. A signifi-
cantly smaller percentage of black non-Hispanic and 
Hispanic families owned both financial and nonfinancial 
assets compared with white non-Hispanic families dur-
ing the 1999 through 2007 time period (appendix figure 
A.1). Even among families owning assets, minorities had 
far lower amounts in each asset class during the 1999 
through 2007 time period (appendix figure A.2). To 
benchmark wealth by race/ethnicity in our data, we 
compare median net worth in the 2007 PSID with median 
net worth in the 2007 SCF. Median net worth in 2007 is 
$122,000 for white non-Hispanic families and $20,000 for 
nonwhite or Hispanic families in the PSID (author’s cal-
culations) and $170,000 and $27,800 in the SCF, respec-
tively (Bucks et al. 2009). 
13. The wealth differences by race and ethnicity remain large 
and statistically significant when measured with means 
instead of medians. For example, mean wealth for black 
non-Hispanics, Hispanics, and white non-Hispanics was 
$75,571, $129,686, and $311,214, respectively, during the 
1999 through 2007 time period. 
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14. As described in the data section, all income variables cap-
ture income in the calendar year prior to the interview. So, 
for example, the 2007 interview collects information about 
income and income sources in calendar year 2006. Other 
family characteristics, such as family composition and size, 
are captured as of the interview date. 
15. We also estimate a model using a measure of permanent 
family income, as discussed below. 
16. The marginal effect is calculated as ߲ܧሺݕ|ݔሻ/߲ݔ௝ ൌ
ߚ௝Φሺ௫ఉఙ ሻ. 
17. Recall that while transfer income received at t−2 is col-
lected, transfer income given at t−2 is not collected. 
18. The dependent variable is set to zero for the 5.5 percent 
of families that have zero net worth and the 11.4 percent 
of families that have negative wealth, since the natural 
log is not defined for negative or zero values. We test 
whether our results are sensitive to treating families with 
negative wealth and zero wealth as having zero log 
wealth versus dropping them. Dropping these observa-
tions from the fixed-effect model produces qualitatively 
similar results: the effect of large gifts/inheritance on 
wealth remains positive and highly statistically signifi-
cant (p=0.00), though the coefficient is slightly smaller. 
The relationship between net support received and 
wealth remains insignificant. 
19. We test whether our results are sensitive using a measure 
of permanent family income (average income from 1998 
to 2006), rather than family income last year; they are not. 
The measured relationship between wealth and large 
gifts and inheritance remains identical in magnitude to 
those shown in table 2, column 1. The measured relation-
ship between net support received and wealth remains 
negative and insignificant. 
20. Given immigrant status’s potentially important role in 
private transfer differences, we examine differences in 
private transfers by immigrant status, as well as race and 
ethnicity, in our regression results below. 
21. Our more recent results differ slightly from Wilhelm’s 
(2001) in that we find black non-Hispanic families are 
more likely to receive support that white non-Hispanic 
families, while Wilhelm finds that black families are 
slightly less likely to receive inter vivos gifts than white 
families. As noted, we both find that conditional on re-
ceiving support or gifts, blacks receive substantially less 
than whites. 
22. The “support received” coefficients less the “support 
given” coefficients do not equal the net “support re-
ceived” coefficients exactly, because net transfers  
received are estimated using WLS regression, while sup-
port received and given are estimated using Tobit  
regressions. The estimated coefficients do sum up exactly 
when WLS is used for all three regressions, in part because 
the black “support given” coefficient becomes  
positive and insignificant. 
23. Table 1 presents the marginal effects and associated 
standard errors from the Tobit model. The estimated co-
efficients and standard errors from the Tobit model are 
presented in appendix table A.1. 
24. To better understand the role of characteristics of the 
extended family, we estimate a specification that excludes 
these variables. When the extended family variables are ex-
cluded, the point estimates on the race/ethnicity/ 
immigration status variables are larger in magnitude (by 
roughly 5 to 38 percent) but are by and large not statisti-
cally significantly different from the coefficients present-
ed in table 1. Regression results are available upon request. 
25. We calculate the dollar change in net worth as 
(exp(0.004)−1) * 83,360, where 83,360 is the weighted me-
dian of net worth. 
26. The full set of coefficients and standard errors are pre-
sented in appendix table A.2. 
27. This finding is based on estimates of equation [5] where 
the weighted average of log net worth is 10.4 for white 
non-Hispanics and 7.2 for black non-Hispanics. The 
weighted averages of large gifts and inheritances accu-
mulated between 1997 and 2007 are $21,320 for white 
non-Hispanics and $2,914 for black non-Hispanics. Since 
large gifts and inheritances are a rare event, we use their 
accumulated value over the past 10 years—between 1997 
and 2007—to measure their accumulative effect on wealth. 
28. See McKernan, Steuerle, and Lei (2010) for a broader 
discussion of wealth-building policies that are inclusive 
of low-income and minority families. 
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Table 1. The Determinants of Private Transfers 
  
Net support 
received 
Support 
received 
Support 
given 
Large gifts/ 
inheritances 
  WLS Tobit Tobit Tobit 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Race, ethnicity, and immigration status         
(Omitted: white non-Hispanic nonimmigrant)         
Hispanic immigrant (0/1) -589.41*** 207.68*** 1,077.64*** -2,123.41*** 
  (91.46) (37.32) (201.90) (237.20) 
Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) -383.05** -126.27** 363.00** -484.50 
  (191.45) (59.62) (181.87) (576.18) 
Black non-Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) -278.03*** 365.07*** -520.16*** -5,012.91*** 
  (63.70) (30.06) (54.76) (414.50) 
Other race non-Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) 228.23 113.11 11.12 32.83 
  (227.59) (134.68) (142.19) (755.37) 
Non-Hispanic immigrant (0/1) -66.77 67.84 493.35*** -1,771.96*** 
  (190.86) (73.18) (118.48) (230.07) 
Characteristics of givers/recipients         
Income ($10,000)         
Family nontransfer income  -113.34*** -69.94*** 52.22*** 124.39*** 
  (20.58) (6.40) (8.11) (37.46) 
Family nontransfer income squared  1.05 1.20*** -0.64*** -1.65** 
  (0.67) (0.12) (0.17) (0.78) 
Age         
Age of head -26.59** -15.75*** 36.70*** 245.89*** 
  (12.10) (4.71) (7.17) (48.62) 
Age of head squared 0.05 0.07 -0.24*** -2.10*** 
  (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.45) 
Education (Omitted: above high school)         
Head less than high school (0/1) -91.37 178.26*** -193.02*** -1,699.43*** 
(81.78) (30.69) (47.60) (302.24) 
Head high school diploma (0/1) -181.03** 223.71*** -168.60*** -1,248.58*** 
  (70.57) (30.15) (41.74) (251.74) 
Family composition (Omitted: married)         
Single-female headed (0/1) 116.55 362.50*** 175.47*** 715.79** 
  (99.30) (55.24) (59.36) (359.19) 
Single-male headed (0/1) -282.63*** 163.55*** 298.81*** 86.38 
  (98.25) (45.80) (69.11) (342.90) 
Number of children  87.13*** -21.75 -195.84***  -458.41*** 
  (28.03) (13.25) (25.70) (131.66) 
Head is student (0/1) 1,501.62*** 527.86*** 362.69 5,001.04 
 (554.45) (185.79) (342.75) (5,130.00) 
(continued)
OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP  PROJECT 
18 18 
Table 1 (continued) 
 
Net support 
received 
Support 
received 
Support 
given 
Large gifts/ 
inheritances 
 WLS Tobit Tobit Tobit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Characteristics of givers/recipients (continued)     
Head or wife disabled (0/1) 140.02** 226.17*** 53.29 271.65 
  (70.27) (39.15) (38.14) (256.55) 
Lives with extended family or adult child (0/1) 96.89 -106.16** -202.67*** -835.55*** 
  (90.38) (41.25) (45.18) (285.04) 
  
Characteristics of extended family         
Number of siblings living -30.71*** -32.14*** 10.92** -162.60*** 
  (9.66) (5.51) (5.26) (42.80) 
Parents living (Omitted: no parent living)         
At least one parent living (0/1) 358.88*** 120.97*** -115.84** -1,622.76*** 
  (94.84) (43.24) (48.92) (335.47) 
Don't know if parents are living (0/1) 245.79*** 44.65 -112.22** -1,164.89*** 
  (89.37) (51.59) (53.19) (272.39) 
Constant 1,856.36*** 
  (338.49) 
Observations 33,947 33,947 33,947 33,947 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007. 
Notes: (1) Weighted least squares (WLS) coefficients and Tobit marginal effects are reported with the associated robust 
standard errors clustered by family in parentheses. The Tobit marginal effects are calculated as ∂E(y|x)/∂xj=βj Φ(xβ/σ). The 
Tobit coefficients and standard errors are presented in appendix table A.1. (2) The top and bottom 0.25% of net worth and 
family nontransfer income are trimmed, as are the top 0.25% of support received, support given, and large gifts/ 
inheritances (among those who reported transfers). Net support received is calculated from these trimmed values. 
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05 
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Table 2. How Private Transfers Influence Wealth? 
  
Non-fixed 
Effect 
Fixed Effect 
  
All All 
White, 
non-
Hispanic 
Black, non-
Hispanic 
Hispanic 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Private transfers     
Net support received t−1 ($1,000) -0.0092* -0.0062 -0.0058 -0.0322 0.0007 
  (0.0055) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0362) (0.0209) 
  [-$763] [-$515] [-$711] [-$576] [$24] 
Large gifts/inheritances t−1 and t−2 ($1,000) 0.0040*** 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0373*** 0.0013 
  (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0114) (0.0032) 
[$331] [$209] [$295] [$691] [$44] 
Observations 27,226 31,826 18,773 9,939 2,157 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007.  
Notes: (1) In all models, the dependent variable is the natural log of wealth at time t and is estimated using weighted least 
squares regressions. Robust standard errors clustered by family are in parentheses and the dollar change in net worth, which is 
calculated as ([exp(β)−1]* median wealth) in brackets. (2) Number of observations differs: column 1 includes family-year  
observations in 2001–2007 and column 2 includes family-year observations in 1999–2007 with families that appear more than 
once in five interviews. (3) The top and bottom 0.25% of net worth and family nontransfer income are trimmed, as are the top 
0.25% of support received, support given, and large gifts/inheritances (among those who reported transfer). Net support received 
is calculated from these trimmed values. (4) All models include control for family nontransfer income and income squared, age 
of head, age of head squared, whether head has less than a high school diploma, whether head has high school diploma only, 
whether a family is single-female headed, whether a family is single-male headed, number of children, whether head is a stu-
dent, whether head or spouse/partner is disabled, and whether extended family or an adult child live with the family. Appendix 
table A.2 shows the full set of results. 
*** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1 
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Figure 1. Percent Likelihood of Receiving or Giving Support in the Past Year and Large 
Gifts/Inheritances in the Past Two Years 
  Support received                         Support given                    Either received or given           Large gifts/inheritances 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007. 
Notes: (1) Statistics are weighted proportions using PSID family core weight. (2) Sample includes 33,947 family-year 
observations; 19,914 are white non-Hispanics, 2,338 are Hispanics, and 10,719 are black non-Hispanics. (3) Significance 
tests are reported between white non-Hispanic and Hispanic, and between white non-Hispanic and black non-Hispanic.  
*** p < 0.01 
Figure 2. Mean Value of Private Transfers in the Past Year and Large Gifts/Inheritances 
in the Past Two Years 
Support received                          Support given                      Net support received          Large gifts/inheritances ($10) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007. 
Notes: (1) Statistics are weighted means using PSID family core weight. (2) Four categories of weighted means are 
calculated: means among those families who report positive support received, positive support given, support either 
received or given, and positive large gifts/inheritances. (3) For support received, support given, and large 
gifts/inheritances, the top 0.25% of outliers among those who reported transfers are trimmed. Net support received is 
calculated from these trimmed values. (4) Significance tests are reported between white non-Hispanic and Hispanic, 
and between white non-Hispanic and black non-Hispanic. 
*** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A.1. Tobit Coefficients on the Determinants of Private Transfers 
Support  
received 
Support 
given 
Large gifts/ 
inheritances 
  Tobit Tobit Tobit 
Race, ethnicity, and immigration status       
(Omitted: white non-Hispanic nonimmigrant)       
Hispanic immigrant (0/1) -3,162.01*** 7,522.56*** -269,466.38*** 
  (747.10) (1,131.43) (60,331.34) 
Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) -1,695.59* 3,357.51** -25,041.71 
  (948.79) (1,372.50) (33,757.73) 
Black non-Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) -6,578.78*** -10,601.44*** -714,007.24*** 
  (639.85) (1,510.49) (78,655.43) 
Other race non-Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) 1,161.72 129.83 1,498.67 
  (1,243.67) (1,644.07) (34,228.85) 
Non-Hispanic immigrant (0/1) 726.59 4,253.47*** -173,360.62*** 
  (735.00) (835.32) (38,398.56) 
Characteristics of givers/recipients       
Income ($10,000)       
Family nontransfer income  -802.72*** 615.61*** 5,719.38*** 
  (77.52) (99.69) (1,654.69) 
Family nontransfer income squared 13.80*** -7.51*** -75.65** 
  (1.38) (2.09) (35.13) 
Age       
Age of head -180.74*** 432.68*** 11,305.78*** 
  (53.66) (85.17) (2,132.65) 
Age of head squared 0.82 -2.78*** -96.52*** 
  (0.52) (0.75) (20.12) 
Education (Omitted: above high school)       
Head less than high school (0/1) -2,361.32*** -2,570.89*** -105,536.09*** 
(454.28) (717.94) (20,710.15) 
Head high school diploma (0/1) -2,825.72*** -2,105.98*** -63,843.23*** 
  (396.44) (551.80) (12,698.09) 
Family composition (Omitted: married)       
Single-female headed (0/1) 3,562.23*** 1,941.98*** 30,804.93** 
  (462.84) (614.66) (14,346.49) 
Single-male headed (0/1) 1,694.60*** 3,049.87*** 3,924.75 
  (424.73) (628.31) (15,354.89) 
continued 
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Appendix Table A.1 (continued) 
 
Support  
received 
Support  
given 
Large gifts/ 
inheritances 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit 
Number of children  -249.63* -2,308.81*** -21,077.11*** 
  (151.24) (313.70) (5,604.35) 
Head is student (0/1) 4,079.44*** 3,322.09 122,985.20 
  (1,031.39) (2,521.72) (76,858.72) 
Head or wife disabled (0/1) 2,312.49*** 613.86 12,121.12 
 (366.83) (429.49) (11,057.23) 
Lives with extended family or adult child (0/1) -1,356.86** -2,844.15*** -46,079.44** 
  (586.60) (743.13) (18,375.66) 
Characteristics of extended family       
Number of siblings living -368.86*** 128.69** -7,476.17*** 
  (62.56) (62.32) (1,964.62) 
Parents living (Omitted: no parent living)       
At least one parent living (0/1) 1,358.88*** -1,384.70** -77,207.25*** 
  (478.72) (595.43) (14,108.24) 
Don't know if parents are living (0/1) 492.58 -1,446.92* -70,393.16*** 
  (549.96) (751.01) (19,986.09) 
Constant -299.33 -31,034.01*** -587,459.69*** 
  (1,417.20) (3,552.11) (63,215.98) 
Observations 33,947 33,947 33,947 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007. 
Notes: (1) Tobit coefficients are reported with the associated robust standard errors clustered by family in 
parentheses. (2) The top and bottom 0.25% of net worth and family nontransfer income are trimmed, as are 
the top 0.25% of support received, support given, and large gifts/inheritances (among those who reported 
transfers). 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
  
OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP  PROJECT 
24 24 
Appendix Table A.2. How Private Transfers Influence Wealth 
  
Non-fixed
Effect 
Fixed Effect 
  
All All 
White, non-
Hispanic 
Black, non-
Hispanic  
Hispanic  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Net support received t−1 ($1,000) -0.009* -0.0062 -0.0058 -0.0322 0.0007 
  (0.005) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0362) (0.0209) 
       
Large gifts/inheritances t−1 and 
t−2 ($1,000) 
0.004*** 0.0025*** 0.0024*** 0.0373*** 0.0013 
  (0.000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0114) (0.0032) 
     
Lagged wealth t−2 0.489*** 
(0.010) 
Race, ethnicity, and immigration 
status 
    
   
(Omitted: white non-Hispanic 
nonimmigrant) 
    
   
Hispanic immigrant (0/1) 0.043 
  (0.129) 
Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) -0.264 
  (0.175) 
Black non-Hispanic nonimmigrant (0/1) -0.652*** 
  (0.091)
   
Other race non-Hispanic non-
immigrant (0/1) 
-0.186
   
  (0.201) 
Non-Hispanic immigrant (0/1) 0.032 
(0.146) 
Characteristics of  
givers/recipients      
Income ($10,000)     
Family nontransfer income 0.217*** 0.1183*** 0.1066*** 0.2539*** 0.2241*** 
  (0.009) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0644) (0.0566) 
Family nontransfer income 
squared 
-0.004*** -0.0018*** -0.0016*** -0.0047*** -0.0056*** 
  (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Age     
Age of head 0.152*** 0.3138*** 0.2975*** 0.3115*** 0.4355*** 
  (0.010) (0.0255) (0.0283) (0.0928) (0.1008) 
Age of head squared -0.001*** -0.0024*** -0.0023*** -0.0021** -0.0036*** 
  (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
continued
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Appendix Table A.2 (continued) 
 
Non-fixed
Effect 
Fixed Effect 
  
All All 
White, non-
Hispanic 
Black, non-
Hispanic  
Hispanic  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Education (Omitted: above high 
school) 
    
   
Head less than high school 
(0/1) 
-0.464*** 0.2731 0.9022 -0.3512 1.0096 
(0.080)  (0.4426) (0.6518) (0.9502) (0.8519) 
Head high school diploma 
(0/1) 
0.089 1.0109** 1.2952*** 0.5411 1.7594** 
  (0.056)  (0.3963) (0.4860) (0.9218) (0.8280) 
Family composition (Omitted: 
married) 
    
   
Single-female headed (0/1) -0.604*** -0.4992 -2.2076** 0.5741 1.4437 
  (0.066)  (0.6050) (0.8950) (0.9964) (1.0410) 
Single-male headed (0/1) -0.469*** -0.5978*** -0.6145*** -0.8364* -0.2124 
  (0.075)  (0.1271) (0.1431) (0.4552) (0.4280) 
Number of children  0.102*** 0.1118*** 0.1242*** 0.0783 0.0946 
  (0.024)  (0.0396) (0.0436) (0.1150) (0.1319) 
Head is student (0/1) -0.649  -0.0726 0.2289 -1.6831* 2.4741** 
  (0.465)  (0.3717) (0.4356) (0.9092) (1.1390) 
Head or spouse/partner disabled 
(0/1) 
-0.308*** -0.0371 -0.0549 0.2152 -0.0325 
  (0.058)  (0.0695) (0.0736) (0.2784) (0.2742) 
Lives with extended family or 
adult child (0/1) 
-0.026 0.1760* 0.1278 0.0122 0.3915 
  (0.077)  (0.1019) (0.1177) (0.2642) (0.3337) 
Constant -0.682*** 
  (0.245) 
Observations 27,226  31,826 18,773 9,939 2,157 
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007. 
Notes: (1) In all models, the dependent variable is the natural log of wealth at time t and is estimated using weighted least 
squares regressions. Robust standard errors are clustered by family in parentheses. (2) Number of observations differs: 
column 1 includes family-year observations in 2001–2007 and column 2 includes family-year observations in 1999–2007 with 
families that appear more than once in five interviews. (3) The top and bottom 0.25% of net worth and family nontransfer 
income are trimmed, as are the top 0.25% of support received, support given, and large gifts/inheritances (among those 
who reported transfer). Net support received is calculated from these trimmed values. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Appendix Figure A.1. Percentage of Asset Ownership by Race and Ethnicity 
Positive net      Nonretirement       Retirement              Home                     Car                     Other                    Debt      
     worth           financial assets         savings                                                              nonfinancial assets 
Financial Assets Nonfinancial Assets
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007.
Notes: (1) Statistics are weighted proportions using PSID family core weight. (2) Sample includes 33,947 family-year 
observations; 19,914 are white non-Hispanics, 2,338 are Hispanics, and 10,719 are black non-Hispanics. (3) Nonretire-
ment financial assets include checking, savings, certificates of deposit, bonds, bills, stocks, mutual funds, and other; 
retirement savings includes IRAs and Keoghs. (4) Significance tests are reported between white non-Hispanic and His-
panic, and between white non-Hispanic and black non-Hispanic. 
*** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Figure A.2. Median Asset Values by Race and Ethnicity 
 Net worth        Nonretirement       Retirement              Home                     Car                     Other                    Debt       
                          financial assets         savings                                                               nonfinancial assets 
                                        Financial Assets                                         Nonfinancial Assets                      
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1999–2007. 
Notes: (1) Statistics are medians among those who own each asset and are weighted using PSID family core 
weight. (2) Sample includes 33,947 family-year observations; 19,914 are white non-Hispanics, 2,338 are Hispan-
ics, and 10,719 are black non-Hispanics. (3) Nonretirement financial assets include checking, savings, certifi-
cates of deposit, bonds, bills, stocks, mutual funds, and other; retirement savings includes IRAs and Keoghs.  
(4) Significance tests are reported between white non-Hispanic and Hispanic, and between white non-Hispanic 
and black non-Hispanic. 
*** p < 0.01 
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